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Introduction 
Although much has been written in the financial press about the evolu-
tion of commercial banking in Saudi Arabia, the constraints imposed by 
Islamic law and practice and the impending difficulties the banks are likely 
to face as the economy goes through a transition from rapid growth with 
abundant oil revenues to one of lower more controlled growth, there have 
been no real attempts other than Wilson's ( 1982a, 1982b, 1986) to quantify 
the relationship between domestic macro-economic and monetary variables 
on the one hand, and the growth of bank deposits and lending on the other. 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify to the degree possible the 
. impact falling oil revenues and hence government expenditures are likely to 
have on the portfolios of the commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. The ulti-
mate purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which these 
developments are likely to affect the volume of private credit extended to 
the private sector. 
A related objective is to examine the ability of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) to control the domestic money supply given the 
rather primitive development of the domestic financial system, the limited 
monetary tools possessed by SAMA and the fact that higher interest rates in 
the euro-markets and few restrictions on capital flows may result in large 
outflows of money from the kingdom. 
* National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943. 
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Structural Changes in Commercial Banking Activity 
Since the 197 3 /7 4 oil price increases growth of the Saudi financial 
system has been phenomenal. By 1984, the eleven commercial banks operat-
ing in the Kingdom had 524 branches compared with only 78 in 1975. By 
1985 their foreign assets had grown to SR 71 billion from SR 32 billion five 
years earlier and their claims on the private sector had nearly doubled to SR 
60 billion in the same period. By 1985, total assets stood at SR 143 billion, 
nearly two times their 1980 value and over nine times their value a decade 
earlier (Table 1). 
Within the context of this rapid growth in assets, several major trends 
have characterized the development of commercial bank assets and liabilities 
(Table 1): 
1. the steady increase in assets over the 1960-7 3 period with re-
serves increasing at an average annual rate of 20.4 percent, foreign assets at 
27 .2 percent, and claims on the private sector increasing at 11.9 percent; 
2. the rapid expansion in assets during the 1973-80 oil boom years, 
TABLE 1. 
SAUDI ARABIA: ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1960-75 
,,,~ 
. , . ~,,~ ,,, ,, .... 
(Billions of Riyals) 
{.· " ~ '.·,•, T.':J ~ ··' ,._,, ,· .. _J,-y';j ''> 
Year Average Annual Growth 
'Asset-Liabillty ' i98o 1960- 1973- 198(). 1960-1%0' 196, 1970 1973. 197, '1985 
'" 
1973 1980 198, 1~ 
Astets I 
., 
Reserves o.u .0.19 022 1.ll 4.85 8.19 12.56 20.4 31.1" u 201!7 
Foreign Assets 0.06 0.19, 0.4, 1.37 3.62 32.23 70.66 27.l 57.0 17.0 32.69 
Claims on Private 
Sector 0.5' 1.03 1.71 2.36 6.72 37.2, 59.81 11.9 48'3 :9.9 20.63 
Liabilities 
Demand Deposits 0.41 055 o.n 2.23 7,!JO }.}.28 46.06 13.9 47-.1 fr.'.:! 20.79 
Quasi Money 
Deposits .o.06 0.25 0.70 1.42 3.13 H.83 44.09 27.6 38.4 26.1 30.21 
Foreign Currency 
Deposits 0.03 0.05 ·o.o4 0.10 0.47 4.65 21.09 9.7 73.1' 35.3 29.98 
Foreign Liabilities ();18 0.18 O.ltl ~.32 ' i.79 9.15 10.38 ..., 6l.!J" 2.6 17.61 
Government 
Deposits -.- o.°' 0.09 0.11 0.28 356 1.37 -.- 64.3 -17.4 -.-
Capital Accounts 0.17 0.14 0.17 tf.24 0.68 4.1' 12.88 2.7 50.3 25.4 18.90 
Other Items (Net) -0.U 0.19 0.44 0.53 1.35 9.04 7.16 -.- 50.0 -·4.6 -.-
Total Assets 
Liabilites 0.72 1.41 2..l8 06 l'-19 77.67 t43.03 16.0 48.13 12.99 23.57 
So1<rce: INTl!ltNATIONAL MoNETARY FUND (1986)."' 
I 
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with reserves increasing at an average annual rate of 31.1 %, foreign assets 
at 57.0%, and loans to the private sector at 48.3%; 
3. the abrupt slow-down over the 1980-85 period in bank assets, 
with reserves increasing at an average annual rate of 8.9%, foreign assets at 
17 .0% and claims on the private sector falling to an average rate of increase 
of 9.9%; 
4. movements in assets have been reflected in a similar movement 
in the liabilities of the commercial banks: 
a) during the 1960-73 period the most significant trend in liabili-
ties was the dramatic increase in quasi money deposits, increasing at an 
average annual rate of 27.6% over this period; 
b) the greatest change in the post 1973 oil boom period was the 
dramatic increase in foreign currency deposits at an average annual increase 
of 73.1 % (from 9.7% per annum during the 1960-73 period), and foreign 
liabilities at 61 % per annum (from 4.5% during the 1960-73 period); 
c) during the 1980-85 period the greatest change in bank liabili-
ties was in government deposits declining at an average annual rate of 
17.4% (in contrast to an average annual rate of increase of 64.3% during 
the 1973-80 period); 
d) the expansion of demand deposits also suffered a rapid decline 
during the 1980-85 period, falling from an annual rate of 4 7 .1 % during the 
1973-80 period to only 6.7% average annual increase in the 1980s. On the 
other hand, quasi money deposits showed great stability, falling only to an 
average annual increase of 26.1 % from an expansion of 38.4% per annum 
during the 1973-80 period; 
e) the most ominous recent trend has been an average expansion 
of assets and liabilities over the 1980-85 period at a rate of about one half 
their pace for the 1960-80 period as a whole and at a rate considerably 
(12.99% vs. 16.00%) below that attained in the 1960-73 period. 
There have been some significant changes in the last several years, 
however, which highlight the new economic climate in which the commer-
cial banks have to operate. The banks are still profitable, but profit levels 
are declining. The two big, fully domestic banks, National Commercial and 
Riyadh, with combined total assets of $25 billion and with over 280 
branches, saw their pre-tax profits on assets ratio decline in 1984 to 0. 92 
and 1.92 respectively. For the first time since 1979, the total assets of banks 
fell in 1984 as public expenditure le~els dropped to their lowest levels for 
five years. As Presley ( 1985) notes, within this less dynamic phase of 
economic development, a number of fundamental changes are likely to be 
forced upon the commercial banking system in Saudi Arabia. 
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TABLE 2. 
SAUDI ARABIA'S COMMERICAL BANK ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(Billions of 'Riyals) 
-
Year 
197.5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 ·1953 1984 
~ 
Rival Accounts 
Reserves 4.85 7.11 13.03 22.12 1U9 8.19 8.27 10.81 8.26 11.04 
Foreign Assets 3.62 8.29 11.28 11.5' 18.19 32.23 53.35 61.00 62.38 67.24 
Domestic Lending 6.72 9.88 10.68 11.40 26.73 37.25 43.25 50.16 %.84 59.63 
Total Assets 15.19 25.28 34.99 45.07 58.51 77.67 104.88 121.97 197.48 137.91 
Transaction Deposits 7.50 13.68 22.16 30.03 31.00 33.28 43.49 49.34 4951 47.86 
Savings Deposits 3.13 4.31 5.85 7.63 9.38 13.83 21.93 29.68 34.13 41.79 
% Assets 
Reserves 31.93 28.13 37.24 49.08 23.23 10.54 7.89 8.86 6.48 8.01 
Foreign Assets 23.83 32.79 32.24 25.63 31.09 41.50 50.88 50.01 48.93 48.76 
Domestic Lending 44.24 39.08 30.52 25.29 4'-68 46.% 41.24 41.12 44.59 43.24 
Transaction Deposits 49.37 54.11 63.33 66.63 ,2.91 42.85 41.47 40.45 38.84 34.70 
Savings Deposits 20.60 17.05 16.72 16.93 16.03 17.81 20.91 60.1.5 26.77 30.30 
% Rate of Growth 
Reserves 
-.- 46.60 83.26 69.76 -38.% -39.73 0.98 30.71 -22.1.5 33.66 
Foreign Assets 129.01 36.07 2.39 57.49 77.19 65.56 14.32 2.26 7.79 
Domestic Lending -.- 47.02 7.98 6.74 134.47 39.36 16.11 15.98 13.32 4.91 
Total Assets 
-.- 66.43 72.25 28.81 29.82 32.75 35.03 16.29 452 8.18 
Transaction Deposits 
-.- 82.40 61.99 35.51 3.32 7.35 30.68 13.45 9.34 - 3.33 
Savings Deposits -.- 37.70 36.22 30.43 22.94 47.44 58.57 35.34 14.99 22.44 



















A detailed examinatfon of the composition of the commercial bank's 
portfolio over the last decade (Table 2) yields further insights into the 
problems currently faced by the Saudi financial community: 
1. reserves as a percent of total assets have fallen from 49.08% in 
1978 to 8.78% in 1985 (up from a low of 6.48% in 1983 ); 
2. despite the decline in oil revenues, foreign assets increased from 
25.63% of total assets in 1978 to 50.88% in 1981, levelling off only 
slightly to 49.40% in 1985; domestic lending showed a similar pattern, 
increasing from 25.29% of total assets in 1978 to 47.96% in 1980 and 
stabilizing at 41.82 % by 1985; 
3. transaction deposits followed a pattern similar to reserves, decreas-
ing from 66.63 percent of total assets to 32.20 percent by 1985; 
4. reserves have shown the most erratic year-to-year movement, 
with savings deposits experiencing the most stability; 
5. the most disturbing trends in the last several years has been the 
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negative growth in transaction deposits in 1984 and 1985 and the rapid 
decline in domestic lending (in the wake of a fairly strong foreign asset 
accumulation in 1984 and 1985). 
According to Abdeen and Shook ( 1984, p. 68), one of the major 
failures of the Saudi financial system has been the failure of commercial 
banks to become increasingly involved in the kingdom's economic diversifi-
cation effort. This fact is reflected in several of the major movements in the 
overall composition of assets in the financial system (Table 3): 
1. the major trend over the 1975-85 period has been the decline in 
the percentage of assets held by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (from 
89.9% in 1975 to 55.22% in 1985); 
2. the specialized banks have shown rapid growth, increasing their 
share of total financial assets in the kingdom from 0.09% in 1975 to 24.94 
percent in 1985; 
3. the commercial banks have shown steady if not spectacular 
growth, increasing their share of total financial assets in the kingdom from 
10.0% in 1975 to 19.84% in 1985; 
4. SAMA has experienced negative asset growth over 1983, 1984 
TABLE 3. 
SAUDI ARABIA: ASSETS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1975-85 
(Billions of Riyals) 
..;..:. 
. Year 
1975 1976 lm 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Total Assets 
Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency 136.'4 180.84 208.27 198.95 207.46 290.n 439.88 484.22 463.49 42152 
Commercial Banks 15.19 25.28 34.99 48.07 58.51 77.67 104.88 121.97 127.48 137.91 
Specialized Banks 0.14 16.46 36.24 52.04 68.18 90.25 112.10 136.56 153.22 170.24 
Total 1'1.87 22258 279.06 299.06 334.13 4.58.67 656.86 742.75 744.19 729.67 
% of Total 
Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency 89.91 81.25 74.52 6653 62.09 63.39 66.97 65.19 62.28 57.77 
Commercial Banks 10.00 11.36 12.52 16.07 17.51 16.93 15.97 16.42 17.13 18.90 
Specialized Banks 0.09 7.40 12.97 17.40 20.40 19.68 17.07 18.39 20.59 23.33 
% Rate of Growth 
Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency -.- 32.44 15.27 - 4.48 4.28 40.15 51.29 10.08 - 4.28 - 9.06 
Commercial Banks 
-.- 66.43 120.17 46.30 0 21.72 32.75 35.03 16.29 4.52 8.18 
Specialized Banks -.- 8122.22 75.27 34.16 30.98 32.41 24.21 21.82 12.20 11.11 
Total -.- 46.56 25.57 7.00 11.73 37.27 43.21 13.08 0.19 - 1.95 
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and 1985, while the commercial and specialized banks have experienced a 
rapid deceleration in their portfolios. 
Clearly, much of the financing of private sector activity usually as-
sumed by commercial banks at the Saudi Arabian level of development has 
been assumed by the government subsidized specialized banks. Given the 
inability of the government to maintain the level of subsidies given to the 
TABLE 4. 
SAUDI ARABIA: COMMERCIAL BANK CREDIT BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1970-1977 
(Billions of Riyals) 
I Year 
ltu 
Sector 1970 1~71 1972 1973 1974 
Agriculture ............. ,,,;,, 9 . 10 10 11 20 
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.7). 
Manufacturing ........ : .... 91 91 112 102 221 
(5.9) (5.6) (6.9) (7.1) (7.2) 
Mining .......................... 27 38 27 35 24 
(1.7) (203) (2.3) (2.4) (0.8) 
Electricity, Water ....... 30 75 83 56 116 
(1.9) (4.6) (5.1) (3.9) (3.8) 
Building & Costruction 308 249 266 302 518 
(20.0) (15.3) (16.4) (20.9) (16.9) 
Commercial .................. 525 536 569 376 1176 
(34.0) (32.9) (35.1) (24.2) (38.5) 
Transport & 38 59 27 41 105 
Communication ....... (2.5) (3.6) (1.7) (2.8) (3.4) 
Finance ......................... 135 148 121 85 63 
(8.7) (9.1) (7.5) (5.9) (2.1) 
Services ........................ 16 22 19 37 67 
(1.0) (1.4) (1.2) (2.6) (2.2) 
Other ............................ 364 401 375 400 478 
(23.6) (24.6) (23.2) (27.7) (24.5) 
Total ............................. 1543 1629 l.619 1445 3058 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
,.,'!c: 
Source: Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. ( ) = % of total. 
,•,;.: 
·• 
1975 1976 1977 
32 52 67 
(0.5) (0.5) (0.7) 
1001 1169 1138 
(15.3) (12.5) (11.8) 
67 41 36 
(f.0) (0.4) (0.4) 
142 299 244 
(2.2) (3.1) (2.5) 
1437 2218 2467 
(21.9) (23.0) (25.6) 
2338 3700 3315 
(35.7) (38.4) (34.4) 
192 231 163 
(2.9) (2.4) (1.7) 
68 163 104 
(1.0) (1.7) (1.1) 
133 234 203 
(2.0) (2.4) (2.1) 
1136 1525 1911 
(17.3) (15.9) (19.8) 
6548 9635 9648 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
.. 
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TABLE 5. 
SAUDI ARABIA: COMMERCIAL BANK CREDIT BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1978-1985 
(Billions of Riyals) 
Year ' • ··1 
Sector 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
.J:.. 
Agriculture .......... : .....•.. 93 249 209 304 421 651 1087 1048 
(0.7) (1.0) (0.6) (0.9) (0.8) (1.1) (1.8) (1.7) 
Manufacturing ............. 1443 2040 2553 3600 4885 5451 ,. 4841 6302 
(10.8) (8.5) (7.8) (10.8) (9.5) (9.6) (7.9) (10.0) 
Mining ................. : ........ 117 525 727 331 274 167 327 923 
(1.3) (2.2) (2.2) (1.0) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (1..5) 
Electricity, Water ....... 469 837 913 1058 1186 1400 1078 1511 
(3.5) (3.5) (2.8) (3.2) (2.3) (2.5) (1.8) (2.4) 
Building & Costruction 2930 5447 7132 8714 11519 13089 11458 13048 
(22.1) (22.8) (21.9) (26.0) (22.9) (23.0) (18.7) (20.8) 
Commercial .................. 4520 8458 12541 15143 17747 19363 25746 22772 
(34.1) (35.4) (34.8) (45.2) (34.7) (34.1) (42.0) (36.2) 
Transport & 316 487 884 1017 2725 2987 3634 3839 
Communication ....... (2.4) (2.0) (2.7) (3.0) (5.3) (5.3) (5.9) (6.1) 
Finance ......................... 225 439 653 917 774 1251 1451 1765 
(1.7) (1.8) (2.0) (2.7) (1.5) (2.2) (2.4) (2.8) 
Services ................•....... 426 835 1315 1610 1933 1445 2484 2996 
(3.2) (3.5) (4.0) (4.8) (3.8) (2.5) (4.1) (4.8) 
Other ............................ 2821 4561 5713 8301 9706 11058 9183 8634 
(21.3) (19.1) (17.5) (24.8) (19.0) (19.4) (15.0) (13.7) 
Total ............................. 13250 23878 32640 33533 51170 56863 61299 62838 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Source: Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. ( ) = % of total. · 
specialized banks, the major factor in affecting the private sector over the 
next several years will be the abiliity and willingness of the commercial 
banks to divert assets from foreign to domestic lending. 
The asser growth of the specialized banks (largely the Saudi Arabian 
Agricultural Bank and the Saudi Industrial Development Bank) are reflected 
(Tables 4 and 5) in the sectoral composition of commercial bank lending: 
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1. by far the greatest volume of commercial bank lending has been 
for construction and commerce - these two sectors accounted for 54 % of 
commercial bank loans in 1970, increasing to 57% in 1980 and 1985; 
2. loans to the agricultural sector have averaged less than one 
percent of total commercial bank credit; 
3. while manufacturing increased its share of commercial bank 
loans from 5.9% in 1970 to 15.3% in 1975, it has not been able to 
maintain this share, and has stabilized in the 9-10 percent range. 
Already the banks are cautious of too heavy involvement in the con-
struction sector. Not only has the fall in government spending diminished 
contract awards in this area, but the initial stage of development, with its 
overriding emphasis upon construction, has largely passed. The Fourth De-
velopment Plan (1985-90) budgets growth in the construction sector to 
actually decline at a rate of 2.5 percent per annum (compared with a decline 
of 1.2 percent per annum during the Third Plan period - 1980-85). 
1. Historically, the commercial banks have been financial "gap-fillers" 
in Saudi Arabia. Unable to compete with the cheap finance offered by, for 
example, the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB), or the Saudi Indus-
trial Development Fund (SIDF) and the Real Estate Development Fund, 
the banks have exploited those areas not favored by government finance. 
These have included, principally, the finance of international trade, construc-
tion finance related to residential building for foreign workers and office 
premises and involvement in industrial and manufacturing finance as a 
result of the ability of the SIDF to offer only 50 percent of any project 
financing. Additionally, the attractiveness of overseas investments has been 
strong, given the risk and uncertainty often attached to domestic lending. 
2. The short-run alternative, of course, is for the commercial banks in 
Saudi Arabia to extend operations in the international markets. The absence 
of sufficient domestic outlets for funds has in the past allowed a strong 
placement of funds abroad; this could be accentuated in future by still more 
foreign branches. 
3. One financial gap which the commercial banks have been reluctant 
to fill is that of small business finance. Saudi Arabia is still predominantly a 
"small business" economy; the government has not yet found a complete 
answer financing the small businessman. The SIDF caters almost exclusive-
ly to large projects. The Third D~velopment Plan called for small-business 
finance, but this did not materialize. The Fourth Plan does the same but 
with reduced government funding, the likelihood is that the commercial 
banks will be called upon to provide this service. As small firms grow more 
• 
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accustomed to drawing up financial statements, so commercial banks can 
more meaningfully assess the viability of financing them. 
4. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA) has taken a more dominant role in bank regulation. This 
was the result of the 1966 Banking Control Law and in particular, the desire 
for a complete Saudi-ization of banks. This has been followed by much 
tighter regulation of the money changers who previously fell outside the 
regulatory process, and who effectively determined the operations of the 
commercial banks. Future commercial bank operations will ultimately be 
determined within the framework laid down by SAMA. 
5. Despite a promise of balanced budgets over the Fourth Plan period, 
one cannot rule out the possible requirement of budget deficit financing, 
given the current shortfall in oil revenues and the apparent inability of 
the government to control current expenditure. In January of 1984, SAMA 
experimented with a 90 day bill. This was not totally successful, largely 
because the banks were reluctant to enter the market. But obviously go-
vernment domestic borrowing on a larger scale would open up more poten-
tial business for the commercial banks. 
6. A further difficult issue currently pressing, and one which SAMA 
cannot stand back from indefinitely, is the question of enforcement of 
interest payments on outstanding loans. This combined with decreases in 
property prices gives the banks a series of difficulties with which to deal 
over the next few years. 
7. In many ways all of this necessitates a new approach to banking in 
Saudi Arabia. There is a short term problem associated with the oil market 
and reduced government expenditure, but bankers should grow more accus-
tomed to thinking long term. Many of the problems currently surfacing are 
the result of short-sighted policies in the 1970s. Over investment in some 
sectors, noticeably construction were predictable; the banks in many ways 
were partly to blame for financing the over ambitious schemes of many of 
their clients without investigating the nature and development of the long 
run market . 
The current danger in Saudi Arabia is that banks and private sector 
alike will react in the opposite direction by failing to providing an adequate 
level of financing, as a consequence of short term signals currently affecting 
decision-making in the kingdom. 
Interest Rates, Saudi Bank Deposits and Foreign Assets 
Although it might be expected that the rate of commercial bank de-
1206 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
mand deposit growth should have accelerated during the 1970s with the 
advent of Saudi-ization, the data for the commercial banks reported by the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency do not appear to confirm this hypothesis. 
As Table 1 indicates, there was a rapid increase in demand deposits over the 
early period following Saudi-ization the value almost trebling between June 
1976 and June 1978; yet demand deposits appear to have virtually stag-
nated between September 1978 and the end of 1980. 
One would expect that, with the development of the country, banks 
should have been gaining deposits, perhaps at the expense of the money 
changers, or more likely as a result of checking being substituted for cash 
transactions. Admittedly, the rate of growth of the currency in circulation 
slowed down in 1978 and 1979, but the contraction in its growth rate was 
much less marked than the fall in the growth rate for demand deposits. 
In addition, it is unlikely that the relative stagnation in demand depos-
its after September 1978 was due to any slowing down in domestic econom-
ic activity, as the rate of growth of GDP actually rose from a rate of 5.9 
percent in 1977-78 to 10.9 percent in 1979-80. This of course reflected 
developments in the oil sector, especially the price rises which occurred in 
1979 from $14 a barrel to over $30. The increase in oil revenues enabled 
the government to increase its expenditure substantially by over 27 percent 
during 1979 compared to an increase of only 7 percent two years earlier, 
when with decreasing oil income the budget actually ran into deficit. The 
private sector of the economy was also more buoyant in the second half of 
the 1976-81 period; indeed its growth was well above that of the public 
sector. As private businesses and individuals constitute the main commercial 
bank customers, this is a further reason for expecting an acceleration in the 
growth of demand deposits rather than a levelling off (Wilson, 1982a, p. 
45). 
If internal factors cannot be used to explain the shortfall in demand 
deposit growth, can external causes be held responsible, especially given the 
openness of the Saudi Arabian economy in general and its financial markets 
in particular? 
The major factors which Wilson (1982a, p. 45) believes have signifi-
cantly influenced flows within the kingdom's domestic banking system have 
been the large increase in interest rates in international financial markets, 
especially during the late 1970s aqd early 1980s. These rates resulted in a 
substantial differential between the returns available in international mar-
kets and those offered in Saudi Arabia, where the authorities not only object 
to usury on Islamic grounds, but also feel it would be inappropriate to 
., 
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penalize private sector borrowers on whom so much of the country's devel-
opment hopes depend. 
The interest rate on three month euro dollar deposits 1 is a useful 
proxy for the spectrum of rates prevailing in international markets, as its 
movements tend to reflect changes generally. In the Saudi Arabian context 
it is particularly relevant, as substantial funds are placed directly into euro 
dollars by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the commercial banks, and 
even private investors. To. test the significance of international interest rates 
in reducing the expansion of demand deposits in Saudi Arabia the following 
model was used: 
(I) D = j(DL, GENAN, GRO, EURO, INFCPI, CBFA, D73) 
+ + + + + ? 
where D = a measure of commercial bank deposits - total deposits, 
and demand deposits; 
DL = deposits lagged one year; 
GENAN =government expenditures; 
GRO = government oil revenues; 
EURO = the euro market interest rate; 
INFCPI = the inflation rate; 
CBF A = the foreign assets of the commercial banking system; 
D7 3 = a dummy :variable to test for possible structural shifts 
associated with the oil price increases in 197 3 /7 4. 
Another variable, government deposits in commercial banks ( CBGD), 
was included in the regressions to see if this policy had been effective in 
increasing deposits. 
This specification with the lagged deposit ratio assumes a distributed 
lag relationship (Griliches, 196 7), where deposits gradually adjust over time 
to increases in government investment and or commercial bank foreign 
assets 2 • The results reveal several interesting patterns: 
1 The euro interest rate is taken as llhe 60d in the INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
(1986). 
' All of the results presented here were obtained through ordinary least squares regression 
estimates. First order serial correlation was corrected for by using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
estimation procedure. 
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(1) CBTD = 0.37 CBDDL + 0.13 GENAN- 0.39EURO- 15.36INFCPI 
(3.37) (4.31) (- 1.73) (- 1.62) 
+ 0.40 CBFA + 7.89 D73 - 0.04 RHO 
(3.44) (2.81) (- 0.22) 
r2 = 0.997; F = 687.62; DW = 2.05 
(2) CBTD = 0.79 CBTDL + 0.09 GENAN- 0.41 EURO- 3.09 INFCPI 
(10.70) (2.06) (- 1.77) (- 0.37) 
+ 1.29 CBGD + 1.98 D73 - 0.22 RHO ; 
(2.58) (1.98) (- 1.11) 
r2 = 0.997; F = 770.33; DW = 2.17 
(3) CBTD = 0.82 CBTDI + 0.06 GRO - 0.38 EURO- 11.44 INFCPI 
(8.28) (6.76) (- 2.30) (- 1.58) 
+ 0.08 CBFA + 4.68 D73 - 0.09 RHO 
(0.72) (2.05) (- 0.45) ~' 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1271.01; DW = 2.05 
(4) CBTD = 0.89 CBTDL+ 0.09 GRO- 0.25 EURO- 7.44 INFCPI 
(41.61) (5.57) (- 1.65) (- 1.45) 
- 0.88 CBGD + 1.77 D73 - 0.26 RHO 
(- 1.52) ( 1.00) (- 1.33) 
r2 = 0.999; F = 1827.69; DW = 2.25 
(5) CBDD = 0.89 CBDDL + 0.06 GRO - 0.44 EURO-' 15 .07 INF CPI 
(8.00) (7.97) (- 2.96) (- 2.36) 
- 0.04 CBFA+ 5.56 D73 + 0.18 RHO 
(- 0.70) (3.10) (0.90) 
r2 = 0.995; F = 387.23; DW = 2.05 
(6) CBDD= 0.65CBDDL+ 0.10 GRO- 0.20EUR0-19.09INFCPI 
(18.82) (8.16) (- 2.55) (- 4.40) 
- 1.55 CBGD + 4.21 D73 - 0.03 RHO 
(- 3.84) (3.28) (- 0.17) 
r2 = 0.998; F = 1007.18; DW = 2/01 
(7) CBDD = 0.09 CBDDL + 0.21 GENAN- 0.29 EURO- 17.49 INFCPI 
(0.44) (5.68) (- 1.63) (- 1.88) 
- C1.02 CBFA + 7.06 D73 - 0.25 RHO 
(- 0.25) (2/76) (- 1.27) 
r2 = 0.995; F = 368.89; DW = 2.12 
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(8) CBDD = 0.20 CBDDL+ 0.17 GENAN- 0.33 EURO- 17.52 INFCPI 
(0.80) (2.44) (- 1.54) (- 2.13) 
0.32 CBGD + 7.65 D73 - 0.14 RHO 
(0.57) (3.40) (- 0.71) 
r2 = 0.994; F = 313.30; DW= 2.04 
1. total deposits ( CBTD) in the Saudi Arabian commercial banking 
system are fairly sensitive to euro rates (EURO) decreasing with increased 
interest rates in these markets; 
2. the distributed lag formulation appears to describe the adjustment 
of demand deposits to changes in oil revenues and variables such as in-
creases in the foreign assets of the commercial banks (CBFA); 
3. a significant structural shift took place with the oil price revolution, 
in 1973-74; 
4. inflation in Saudi Arabia appears to drive deposits out of the king-
dom, and/or reduce their rate of expansion; 
5. oil revenues ( GRO) tend to give slightly better results than govern-
ment expenditures (GEN AN); 
6. the same patterns hold with respect to demand deposits with the 
exception that demand deposits do show a much closer relationship with oil 
revenues than government expenditures; 
7. the impact of government oil revenues on demand deposits follows 
the distributed lag pattern found above for total deposits; while government 
expenditures impact directly on demand deposits with their effect not 
spread over time. 
In general, if the purpose of increased government deposits with the 
banking system was to increase deposits, this policy has not been successful. 
These results are somewhat at odds with those obtained by Wilson 
(1982a 3, p. 45-46), who concluded that: 
The regression results therefore point to the need for caution in ascribing the 
relative stagnation in bank deposits to rises in euro dollar rates ... It would be 
erroneous to conclude that external interest-rate factors react through domestic 
demand deposit to cause liquidity shortages in Saudi Arabia, although this effect 
cannot be dismissed. 
Wilson speculated that the b11nks themselves, rather than their deposi-
tors or potential depositors, respond to external interest stimuli by holding 
' Wilson's data is monthly, compared with the annual data used here. His regressions 
were for the period October 1978 to April 1981, whereas the analysis here covered the period 
1960-85. 
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foreign funds which might otherwise be made available to domestic bor-
rowers (Wilson, 1982a, p. 48). 
To determine whether commercial banks may have restricted local 
business to take advantage of higher yielding euro assets, the following 
model (with expected signs) of private sector credit from the commercial 
banking system was estimated along lines similar to (I) and (II) above: 
(II) PSC = /(PSCL, GENAN, GRO, EURO, INFCPI, CBFA, D73) 
+ + + 
where: 
PSC = private sector credit from the commercial banking system; 
PSCL = private sector credit lagged one year; 
EURO = the euro interest rate; 
GENAN =government expenditure; 
GRO = government oil revenues; 
INFCPI = consumer price inflation; 
D73 = dummy variable to test for structural shifts associated 
with the 73/74 oil price increases. 
Again, to test for the robustness of the results, government deposits in 
commercial banks ( CBGC) were included in the equation. 
Again several interesting ·patterns emerge from the regressions: 
(9) CBPS = 1.10 CBPSL + 0.12 GENA!'{+ 0.44 EURO + 7.34 INFCPI 
(4.99) (4.83) (2.59) (1.13) 
- 0.33 CBFA - 2.36 D73 + 0.10 RHO 
(- 1.70) (- 1.20) (0.51) 
r2 = 0.995; F = 396.32; DW = 1.99 
(10) CBPS = 0.70 CBPSL + 0.13 GENA!'{+ 0.64 EURO+ 13.04 INFCPI 
(11) CBPS = 
(11.74) (6.12) (3.58) (2.23) 
- 0.91 CBGD - 3.90 D73 + 0.42 RHO 
1.30 CBPSL + 
(2.38) 
(- 3.38) (- 2.15) (2.32) 
r2 = 0.992; F = 245.09; DW = 1.79 
0.03 GRO+ 0.37 EURO- 9.51 INFCPI 
·(1.28) (1.48) (- 1.14) 
- 0.38 CBFA + 2.30 D73 - 0.01 RHO 
(- 1.14) (2.30) (0.90) 
r2 = 0.989; F = 245.09; DW = 1.79 
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(12) CBPS = 0.92 CBPSL + 0.05 GRO + 0.52 EURO- 8.11 INFCPI 
(19.19) (2.05) (2.03) (- 1.06) 
1.30 CBGD + 0.54 D73 - 0.02 RHO 
(- 1.58) (0.54) (0.09) 
r2 = 0.991; F = 236.89; DW = 1.97 
The results indicate that: 
1. private credit exhibits a strong distributed lag relationship with 
government expenditures, with government expenditures (GEN AN) consid-
erably stronger than government oil revenues ( GRO) in affecting private 
sector credit; 
2. higher euro market rates, contrary to expectations, appear to result 
in increased commercial bank credit to the private sector; 
3. however, the foreign assets held by the commercial banks appear to 
have a weak, adverse impact on commercial bank credit to the private 
sector. 
In general, therefore, the fears expressed by some observers that com-
mercial bank" would likely shift their assets from domestic loans to invest-
ments outside the kingdom during periods of relatively high euro interest 
rates, do not appear to be borne out. On the other hand there does appear 
to be a general portfolio effect whereby increased foreign asset holdings on 
the part of the commercial banks tend to reduce the overall volume of credit 
to the private sector. 
The third relationship involves the foreign asset holdings of the com-
mercial banks. Here it is likely that another distributed lag relationship 
holds, with foreign assets increasing with increased government expendi-
ture, foreign liabilities of the commercial banks, euro rates, and domestic 
inflation. More formally, along the lines of I and II above: 








+ + + + + ? ? 
. foreign assets held by the commercial banks; 
= foreign assets held by the commercial banks lagged one 
year 
= government oiL revenues; 
= foreign liabilities of the commercial banks; 
= the euro interest rate; 
= shift dummy variable to test for structural shifts asso-
ciated with 1973-74 oil revenue increases; 
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AGENAN = dummy slope variable to test for structural shifts asso-
ciated with the 1973-74 oil revenue increases. 
Again private sector deposits in the commercial banking system 
( CBTD), private sector quasi deposits in the commercial banking system 
( CBQD), and government expenditures ( GENAN), and government deposits 
in commercial banks ( CBGD) were also added to test the robustness of the 
results. 
The results 4 : 
(13) CBFA = 0.90 CBFAL. + 0.03 GRO + 0.63 EURO+ 16.50 INFCPI 
(24.36) (3.64) (3.00) . (2.23) 
+ 1.32 CBFL- 7.86 D73 + 0.17 RHO 
(4.60) (- 3.64) (0.86) 
r2 = 0.994; F = 361.82; DW = l.97 
(14) CBFA = 0.94 CBFAL + 0.06 GRO + 0.74 EURO+ 4.51 INFCPI 
(17,15) (2.17) (2.17) (0.43) 
0.65 CBGD- 3.77 D73 + 0.23 RHO 
(- 0.68) (- 1.13) (1.17) 
r2 = 0.986; F = 144.27; DW = 1.64 
(15) CBFA = 0.89 CBFAL + 0.03 GENAN + 0.97 EURO+ 22.45 INFCPI 
(11.49) . (0.77) (3.66) (2.30) 
+ 1.42 CBFL- 8.36 D73 + 0.27 RHO 
(3.53) (- 2.85) (1.38) 
r2 = 0.988; F = 173.70; DW = 1.91 
(16) CBFA = 0.58 CBFAL + 0.02 GRO + 0.73 EURO+ 20.48 INFCPI 
(3.96) (1.35) (2.61) (1.88) 
+ 0.38 CBTD- 8.31 D73 + 0.25 RHO 
(2.61) (- 2.56) (1.30) 
r2 = 0.989; F = 186.55; DW = 1.72 
' The dummy variable D73 consists of v"alues of 0 for 1960-72 and 1 for the period 
1973-85. The AGENAN is a slope dummy variable introduced to test for any change in the 
impact, i.e. slope, of the regression equation associated with increased government expenditures 
and commercial bank foreign assets. It was created by multiplying D73 times GENAN. A 
negative sign would indicate that government expenditures as a proportion of commercial bank 
foreign assets declined after 1973-74. 
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(17) CBFA = 0.38 CBFAL + 0.05 GRO + 0.45 EURO+ 8.30 INFCPI 
(1.81) (4.80) (2.25) (1.14) 
+ 0.68 CBFL+ 0.87 CBQD- 6.19 D73 
(1.90) (2.45) (- 3.08) 
r2 = 0.996; F = 510.2; DW = 2.00 
(18) CBFA = 0.44 CBFAL + 1.27 GENAN+ 0.91 EURO+ 26.18 INFCPI 
(2.36) (2.20) (2.91) (2.52) 
+ 0.61 CBTD- 1.32 AGENAN + 0.74 RHO 
(3.54) (- 2.29) (5.40) 
r2 = 0.941; F = 32.30; DW = 1.68 
(19) CBFA = 0.86 CBFAL + 1.39 GENAN+ 1.04 EURO+ 26.70 INFCPI ~ 
(6.83) (2.42) (1.04) (2.48) 
+ l.l6CBFAL+ 0.38CBDD- l.44AGENAN + 0.76RHO 
(2.45) (1.45) (- 2.50) (5.74) 
r2 = 0.941; F = 32.43; DW = 1.97 
indicate that: 
1. as anticipated,· commercial bank foreign assets exhibit a strong dis-
tributed lag, particularly with regard to oil revenues; 
2. increases in the Euro rates tend to result in Saudi commercial banks 
increasing their holdings of foreign assets; 
3. there appears to be a fairly close link - one to one - between 
foreign assets and foreign liabilities of the commercial banks; 
4. foreign assets appear to be associated largely with quasi deposits 
rather than demand deposits in commercial banks (as evidenced by the 
statistically significant sign on quasi deposits and the statistically significant 
sign on total deposits, but not demand deposits in the commercial banks); 
5. increased rates of domestic inflation apparently create incentives for 
banks to shift assets from domestic to foreign in order to maintain positive 
real returns; 
6. Government deposits in the commercial banks do not appear to be 
used for foreign asset acquisition. 
It is apparent, therefore, that periods of high interest rates do pose a 
fairly serious problem for the Saudi banking system. The results presented 
above indicate that increased euro t4ates tend to significantly reduce the 
volume of demand deposits in commercial banks and tend to increase the 
holdings of foreign assets on the part of the commercial banks. In addition 
it appears that high euro rates, while not impacting directly on private sector 
credit from the commercial banks, may do so indirectly through the negative 
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impact that a shift into foreign assets has on the portfolios of the commer-
cial banks. 
It is clear from the analysis and discussion above that the government 
has the ability through altering its deposits in commercial banks to play an 
active role in stabilizing the level of deposits in the financial system. To 
determine how effective the government has been in this regard a model 
was constructed along the lines above whereby 
(IV) CBGD=f(CBGDL, GENAN, GRO, EURO, INFCPI, CBD, D73) 
+ + + ? ? 
where: 
CBGD = government deposits in commercial banks; 
GENAN =government expenditures; 
GRO = government oil revenues; 
EURO = the euro interest rate; 
INFCPI = the rate of consumer price inflation; 
CBDD = demand deposits in commercial banks; 
? 
D7 3 = dummy variable to account for structural change asso-
ciated with the 197 3-7 4 oil price increases. 
Based on the assumed sig~s, we may conclude that the government 
policy of deposits in the commercial banking system would stabilize deposits 
if a negative sign was found on the deposit term i.e., government deposits 
increased during periods of low private sector deposits. 
The analysis yielded: 
(20) CBGD = 0.07 CBGDL + 0.03 GRO + 0.08 EURO- 3.23 INFCPI 
(0.77) (8.74) (1.54) (- 1.28) 
- 0.06 CBDD- 1.07 D73 - 0.25 RHO 
(- 2.40) (- 1.07) (- 1.29) 
r2 = 0.957; F = 67.38; DW = 1.81 
Dropping the insignificant dummy yielded: 
(21) CBGD = 0.10 CBGDL + 0.03 GRO + 0.06 EURO- 5.70 INFCPI 
(1.15) ,9.12) (1.14) (- 4.81) 
0.08 CBDD 
(- 6.14) 
r2 = 0.962; F = 50.85; DW = 1.83 
.. ~· ' 
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(22) CBGD = 0.03 GRO · + 
(10.03) 
0.11 EURO - 0.03 CBDD - 1.67 D73 
(2.20) (- 2.73) (- 5.20) 
r2 = 0.953; F = 81.37; DW = 1.90 
"· Summary and Conclusions 
f Parallel to the rapid economic development, there has also been an 
expansion of banking and finance institutions in Saudi Arabia. However, 
money, banking and the basic rules of finance are essentially the same as 
they were twenty-five years ago when the Saudi society and economy were 
stagnant (Al-Timimi, 1985, p. 83) . 
SAMA's rules of operation today in an open and affluent economy are 
no different from what they were then. It still provides the medium of 
exchange with limited control over credit in the economy. The reasons for 
this are historical and social and include the rather fortunate financial posi-
tion of Saudi Arabia, which has made simple, indigenous and unique rules 
and policies of monetary management still functional (Al-Timimi, 1985, p. 
83 ). 
However, it appears from the analysis above that the country may no 
longer have the luxury of sustaining a somewhat antiquated financial struc-
ture. It is clear from the results· above that the country may be very vulnera-
ble to a serious liquidity crisis if significant increases in euro rates were to 
take place in an environment in which the government was unable because 
of slack revenues to significantly increase its expenditures. Clearly, recent 
movements in the direction of incorporating aspects of the interest rate into 
the financial system should be sped up if the kingdom is to sustain steady 
growth during the current period of relatively low and stagnant oil rev-
enues. 
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CONSEGUENZE DEL SOTTOSVILUPPO FINANZIARIO IN ARABIA SAU-
DIT A 
Scopo di questo articolo e di quantificare al massimo l'impatto che la diminu-
zione dei ricavi petroliferi e quindi della spesa puhblica probabilmente avranno 
sul portafoglio delle banche commerciali dell'Arabia Saudita. Lo scopo finale 
dell'analisi e di determinare in quale misura questi sviluppi influenzeranno i1 
volume del credito privato destinato al settore privato. Come obiettivo collegato 
viene esaminata l'abilita della hanca centrale (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) 
nel controllo dell'offerta di moneta dato lo sviluppo piuttosto primitivo del siste-
ma finanziario interno, i limitati strumenti monetari posseduti dalla SAMA e il 
fatto che piu alti tassi d'interesse negli euromercati e !imitate restrizioni sui flussi 
di capitale possono determinare ingenti deflussi di moneta dal regno. 
